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Development financial institutions around the world are shifting 
towards greater transparency, better governance and greater social 
and environmental responsibility. At the center of these changes 
is the relationship of each of these institutions with their State 
(shareholder) in what it refers to operational and financial autonomy, 
taxation and distribution of profits and dividends. Despite the 
specificities of each relationship, some combinations of operational 
and financial autonomy and corporate responsibility provide these 
institutions with better performance and institutional stability 
to carry out its mandate with a long-term perspective. In Brazil, 
BNDES follows this renewal movement.
Keywords: BNDES; Development bank; Development financial 
institution; Long-term financing; State-owned bank.
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Introduction
The role of development financial institutions (DFI) is changing. 
Not with regard to their ultimate goals of financing the economic 
and social development that will promote better living conditions 
in their countries. However, the way to achieve this development 
lies at the heart of the intense restructuring that a large number of 
DFIs in the world are experiencing. The main point is that all efforts 
and resources should be directed towards sustainable economic and 
social growth, to the maximum extent. DFIs should establish their 
actions today taking into account the concern for the long-term 
well-being of the local and global population.
All the economic sectors are being affected by the new demands 
of a society that asks for their authorities’ commitment to the 
improvement of life conditions. The industry must provide 
innovative technologies appropriate to the new demands of the 
population, while the services sector must provide knowledge, 
human skills and management of institutions renewed by high 
technology. The alignment with the goals of environmental 
improvement on an international scale propels new clean 
technologies, the development of a sustainable infrastructure, an 
urban planning that reconfigures the way of life of the cities, and a 
scientific and environmentally clean agriculture.
In pursuit of an economic growth that is in harmony with 
a sustainable development, the DFIs are being renewed. 
The environment conducive to change also requires greater 
transparency, greater effectiveness and greater commitment 
of DFIs to socioenvironmental outcomes. In the center of these 
transformations are their fiscal relationship with the state and their 
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governance. A responsible and effective corporate relationship 
can create the conditions for these institutions to migrate to the 
new economy along with their clients and in line with what their 
societies desire.
The aim of this article1 is to present some recent international 
experiences that reinforce the importance of DFIs in the economy, 
both in a crisis environment and in the midst of a technological 
change. The relationship with the State, the governance structure, 
the concern with profitability and with the technical, economic 
and socioenvironmental feasibility are the starting points for the 
DFIs’ adaptation to the future wanted and required of them.
In the next section, we review the role of the DFIs, highlighting 
the contribution of other BNDES specialists to the importance 
of the development function of a financial institution, a theme that 
is proposed as the basic premise in this study. Also worthy of note 
are the views of the European Commission and the United Nations 
on the relevance of DFIs in an environment of economic crisis. In the 
third section, we discuss the relationship of some institutions with 
the State regarding sources of funding, state guarantee, dividends, 
taxation and regulation. In the fourth section, we point out some 
lessons that can be learned from international experiences, so that, 
in the fifth section, some aspects of the ongoing renewal in BNDES, 
associated with the good international practices of DFI governance, 
can be presented. The brief conclusions summarize the practices 
that are considered good experiences to be replicated.
1 The report sent to ABDE — Estratégia para tratamento fiscal diferenciado às agências financeiras 
oficiais de fomento (Strategy for Differential Tax Treatment to Official Financial Development 
Agencies) — was based in a questionnaire answered by the listed foreign institutions in order 
to develop a strategic approach for regional development agencies associated with ABDE.
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The role of DFIs
Basic definitions
According to Além and Madeira (2015), the need for State 
intervention in the financial market arises from the perception, by 
public agents, that the market will not operate efficiently if guided 
freely by its own forces. Not only because the financial market is 
subject to certain failures or limitations, but also because intrinsic 
structural problems, such as the presence of uncertainty, confidence 
crisis between agents and economic cycles provoked by instability 
of expectations.
To be efficient, a financial system must be functional regarding 
economic development, that is, it must support productive investment, 
the pillar of economic growth. This functionality needs to be built up 
by public policy, through a regulatory apparatus and by the creation of 
institutions, structures and instruments for the provision of adequate 
financial resources for investment.
Além and Madeira (2015) point out that, although there is 
no consensus in literature on the definition of DFIs, the most 
commonly adopted concept encompasses development banks and 
other institutional structures, such as development agencies, export 
credit agencies (ECA) and international cooperation agencies. 
It also includes hybrid institutions with similar initiatives and 
characteristics to development banks that provide long-term 
financing for specific segments, such as multiple public banks and 
pension fund or savings deposits institutions.
In general, DFIs are public and usually focus on financing investment 
projects through long-term maturing loans, some of which also provide 
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guarantees and insurance, capital inflows into companies, and export 
financing of goods and services. They function in a complementary 
way to the private market, and most of them operate indirectly 
through private financial institutions, while others operate directly in 
specific segments. DFIs can be regional, national or multilateral.
According to Aronovich and Fernandes (2006), DFIs are instruments 
of economic policy, whose performance must be evaluated 
predominantly by the social and economic benefits that their 
operations provide. They can fulfill two types of mandates:
• support to specific market segments that generate relevant 
socioeconomic impacts; or
• provide broad financing to several sectors/segments to foster 
the socioeconomic development of a given region or country.
The existence of public DFIs is justified by the presence of investment 
projects or sectors that require financing, but which are neglected by 
the private sector because of the greater uncertainty on future results. 
This is the case of more complex sectors and projects that require 
expertise for their economic-financial evaluation or that can generate 
positive externalities that transcend any short-term evaluation, 
such as in infrastructure projects, technological innovation, micro, 
small and medium-sized enterprises (MSME), microcredit, and 
environmentally sustainable projects. Public DFIs also assume the 
function of providing financial autonomy for the execution of public 
policies focused on fostering strategic development segments or that 
are a response to unexpected crises or catastrophes.
Recent views on the role of DFIs
Wruuck (2015) emphasizes that, in recent years, particularly within 
the European Union, discussions have intensified on the role of 
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DFIs and their ability to increase access to finance, particularly for 
MSMEs and long-term investments in infrastructure.
As a result of the international crisis, many European DFIs have 
become more active and are seen as one of the main instruments for 
dealing with both structural and cyclical difficulties in the economy.
A recent European Commission document (2015) on the role of 
national promotional banks in supporting the Investment Plan 
for Europe points to the importance of national development 
banks  (BNF)2 to improve the impact on investment, economic 
growth and employment.
The Investment Plan for Europe provided for the mobilization of 
at least € 315 billion in additional public and private investment in 
the real economy in three years. For the purposes of the plan, BNFs 
have been defined as legal entities that have carried out financial 
activities and which have been given a mandate by a member state 
or entity of a member state at the national, regional or local level 
for the purpose of implementing development.
The European Commission points out that the main economic reason 
for the existence of a BNF is the presence of market failures that affect 
the supply and demand of investments. It cites factors such as: the 
asymmetric information to economic agents, influencing the choices 
in risky and low knowledge environments; the fact that the social gains 
provided by project externalities are not perceived by private agents; 
and the market power as a resultant from the low level of competition. 
These shortcomings may lead to reduced investment and, therefore, 
slower future growth than would be economically efficient.
2 This section refers to national development banks (BNF) in the same sense as the DFIs, 
in order to maintain the original term used by the European Commission.
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According to the European Commission, since BNFs are financed 
and supported by the State, they have a competitive advantage over 
private market operators and are better able to overcome market 
failures. Thus, the economic logic of BNFs performance should lie 
in their ability to facilitate financing where the market does not 
guarantee sufficient supply of private financing, or where private 
operators would have no interest in participating or should not 
intervene in any way.
The document notes that in recent years the BNFs activities have 
intensified in order to compensate for the necessary deleveraging of 
commercial banks, in addition to playing an important role in the 
implementation of the European Union’s financial instruments. A 
number of member states that did not have a national development 
bank decided to create one, while others studied this possibility.
The European Commission also presents a list of recommendations 
for the legislative framework, regulations and governance structures 
of development banks to prevent risks and take full advantage of 
the benefits of these entities, notably:
• Bank statutes should clearly stipulate the focus on activities 
or sectors where market failures are widespread and in which 
there is insufficient coverage by commercial banks and other 
private credit providers.
• In order to avoid distortions in the market, regardless of the 
market failure to be addressed by the BNF, an ex-ante analysis 
should be conducted to assess the relative effectiveness and 
efficiency, to the interaction between the existing financing 
channels (private and public), and the financial instruments 
to be adopted by the bank.
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• Prioritize projects of economic feasibility and sufficient 
profitability to maintain financial viability, avoiding 
continuous injections of capital by the State.
• They should respect the rules of transparency, accountability 
and professional management, and should adopt independent 
prudential supervision.
• The separation between the board of directors and executive 
management should be adopted.
• And they should adopt solid risk management and effective 
internal control procedures.
These measures seek to meet the increasingly pressing goal of 
improving corporate governance and, because they refer to public 
institutions, they aim to ensure operational autonomy to managers 
and directors of these institutions and also the institution’s financial 
independence. These factors, as will be seen in several sections of 
this article, are fundamental in the renewal of the DFIs.
In addition, the European Commission has positively evaluated 
the contribution of BNFs to maintaining fair competition in the 
financial markets when they distribute their products indirectly 
through the commercial banking sector. Close interaction with 
the private sector can enable the BNF to adapt its product range 
to market failures. Moreover, it gives a positive signal about the 
possibilities of bank financing for certain types of projects that are 
excluded from their traditional investment policy, thus attracting 
private funds to their scope of activities, without hindering private 
sector activities. In this way, it is believed that indirect operations, 
through financial intermediaries, can reduce the risks of exclusion 
and discrimination of private financing and also ensure that benefits 
reach the final beneficiary.
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Another important function of indirect operations is to transfer 
the knowledge acquired in new operations and new sectors with 
innovative financial products and others to the private sector. A 
product or program is tested by initially dividing the risk, and 
then the private partner is allowed to perform and assume the 
management of that product or program.
The document brings up an important shift in the view of the 
European Community, which used to be averse to development 
banks, as they were evaluated based on cost-benefit analyses and on 
maximizing efficiency in the allocation of public resources. The clear 
admission of the role and importance of the development banks and 
the encouragement to the creation of new banks represent a change 
in the more liberal view previously adopted, by admitting that DFIs 
may be important in channeling public resources to activities that, 
despite having negative present value, generate positive externalities.
Recently, the UN (2017) in the Development Financing Report, in its effort 
to globally implement the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development, 
added other relevant points to the role of development banks:
• They can mobilize financial markets resources at rates lower 
than those obtained by the private financial sector.
• They can mobilize private capital for specific projects through 
co-finance, providing guarantees and other instruments.
• Their experience enables them to improve the technical 
quality of projects by providing technical assistance, economic 
viability and dissemination of best practices.
• They can promote actions aligned with sustainable 
development and ensure that the public interest is obtained 
in infrastructure investments.
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The report also points out that, as experience shows, a key point for 
the success of a DFI is the existence of a well-defined and precise 
mandate for development banks, especially the national ones, as 
specified by law and in line with a long-term development strategy 
associated to solid governance structures, ensuring that compliance 




especially regarding the 
relationship with the State
The intervention of DFIs (particularly development banks) in 
the provision of business credit especially focused on increasing 
productive capacity is a widespread resource, adopted in all types 
of economies, whether developed, developing or emerging.
According to Eslava and Freixas (2016), DFIs are not only numerous, 
but also widely diverse as to the tasks they perform and the 
models upon which they operate. Specifically for Latin America, 
Eclac (2016) warns of the challenges of financing development in 
our continent.
The importance of DFIs in the economies of their countries and of 
the world should not be underestimated. The combined assets of a 
sample of 11 DFIs totaled US$ 3.7 trillion in 2015, equivalent to 12% 
of the consolidated GDP of the respective countries (Table 1). In the 
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comparison between the DFIs, the most important is the Cassa 
Depositi and Prestiti (CDP), with 24% of the assets in relation to 
gross domestic product (GDP), followed by the Korea Development 
Bank (KDB) with 19%, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) with 
17%, and the China Development Bank (CDB) with 16%.
Regarding the relative size, CDB has the highest volume of assets, 
corresponding to almost three times that of KfW, the second largest 
institution. In turn, the German bank is more than twice the size 
of BNDES, which, however, has a significant participation in the 
Brazilian economy (13%).
It should be noted that the share of the Japan Finance Corporation 
(JFC) assets in GDP is less expressive (4.4%) than the previous ones, 
but this is due to the fact that the Japanese development system is 
segmented in several specialized institutions. Adding JFC’s assets 
to those of Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), the 
share of GDP in these two DFIs reached 7.7% in 2014.
Table 1 • Assets and GDP for selected DFIs






KfW (Germany) 547 3,289 16.6%
Vnesheconombank (Russia) 64 1,326 4.8%
Nacional Financiera (Mexico) 22 1,142 1.9%
Caisse des Dépôts et 
Consignations (France)
170 2,375 7.1%
Cassa Depositi e Prestiti 
(Italy)
433 1,780 24.3%
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(Continuation)






Korea Development Bank 
(South Korea)
263 1,410 18.6%
Instituto de Crédito Oficial 
(Spain)
68 1,176 5.8%
Japan Finance Corporation 
(Japan)
206 4,622 4.4%
Business Development Bank of 
Canada (Canada)
15 1,553 1.0%
BNDES (Brazil) 236 1,769 13.3%
Total 3,685 30,798 12.0%
Source: ABDE (2016).
Note: Values converted to dollar based on the exchange rate on the last day of the year.
DFIs’ areas of activity
As seen above, DFIs usually operate in sectors and segments not 
served by the private credit market, such as infrastructure, MSMEs, 
exports, innovation and the green economy (Table 2).
Many DFIs operate in several segments, such as KfW (Germany), 
KDB (Korea) and BNDES. Others are specialized in certain sectors 
or segments, such as JHC (Japan), in housing; ABC (China) and 
Rentenbank (Germany), both in agriculture; or in certain activities 
such as KfW’s Ipex, in exports, or market niches, such as JFC (Japan) 


























Agriculture x x x x
Infrastructure x x x x x x x
Industry x x x x x x x x
Trade and services x x x x x x
Si
ze
MSME x x x x x x x x





Housing x x x
Exports x x x x x
Innovation x x x x x x x x
Green economy x x x x x x x x
Internationalization x x x x x x x x




x x x x
Source: Além and Madeira (2015). 
We can observe that the selected DFIs focus unanimously on the 
development of MSMEs. As for the segments in which they operate, they 
all support innovation, the green economy, the internationalization 
of companies and the capital market.
DFIs’ relationship with the State
The relationship between the DFIs and the State consists, on 
the one hand, of the capital provision to these institutions, the 
transfer of financial resources and the granting of State guarantees 
in financial operations. On the other hand, it consists of the 
returns of operational results to the public treasures, in the form 
of dividends and tax collection.
The relations of the DFIs with the State are characterized by the 
direct and indirect benefits that vary, case by case and over time, 
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as the institution becomes stronger and independent, and the 
institutional and legal environment changes according to economic 
and political transformations.
A most accurate data and information on the relationship of 
foreign DFIs with the respective public entities to which they are 
subordinated are difficult to obtain. The international experiences 
of development banks with transparency were detailed in the 
analysis of Madeira (2015). Based on the statutes and the reports of 
the institutions, in an interesting framework the author summarizes 
the financial regimes to which some selected DFIs are submitted 
(Table 3). In this survey, in addition to data and information from 
entities reports and documents, the study presented to ABDE 
sought to detail characteristics and specificities in each case.3
Table 3 • Financial regimes of the selected DFIs
















KfW (Germany) N N N Y Y6
Vnesheconombank 
(Russia) 
N N N N¹ Y
Nacional Financiera 
(Mexico)
N N Y Partial² N
Japan Finance 
Corporation (Japan)
Y N N Y Y




Y N N Y Y
(Continued)
3 The report presented to ABDE contains a comparative analysis based on a questionnaire 
sent to 12 selected DFIs, with a list of questions about the characteristics and forms of 























Y N N Y N
Caisse des Dépôts 
et Consignations 
(France)
Y N Y Y N
Cassa Depositi e 
Prestiti (Italy)
Y N.D Y Partial³ N
China Development 
Bank (China)




Y N Y Partial5 Y
Instituto de Crédito 
Oficial (Spain)
Y N Y Y Y
BNDES (Brazil) Y Y Y N Y
Source: Madeira (2015).
Notes: 1 – Despite it not being in the statute, some titles are state-guaranteed. 2 – For commitments 
to national natural persons and foreign companies/governments and for deposits of governments 
and corporations. 3 – For saving deposits via postal institutions. 4 – For bonds in possession of the 
local banks. 5 – For debts in foreign currency and for bonds related to the industrial policy. Losses 
compensated in case of absence of reserves. 6 – Only for some previously established programs, 
being a small part of the total.
We can observe a wide variety of institutional arrangements, 
financial regimes and relationship models between the DFIs and 
their respective public controllers with respect to funding and state 
guarantee; payment of dividends; tax payment; and regulation and 
compliance to Basel Agreement.
Funding and state guarantee
There are different ways for DFIs to obtain funding for their 
operations, among which are included savings and deposits from 
individuals, loans from another financial institution, through 
fundraising in the domestic and international capital markets, using 
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own equity or returns on equity, and resources from government 
budgets. Each DFI uses a certain combination of these possibilities.
Among the 12 selected DFIs, seven use fiscal or quasi-fiscal 
resources, especially BNDES, which has access to a fund that foster 
employment, the Workers’ Assistance Fund (FAT) to cover its 
disbursements, while the others do not have this type of access. 
On the other hand, six of them have explicit full state guarantee to 
their commitments and four have partial guarantees, that is, only 
on certain securities or bonds. In the case of the Bank of Russia, 
although there is no provision in its statute, some bonds are issued 
with government guarantee. Only BNDES does not have an explicit 
guarantee from the government on its obligations, which increases 
its market funding costs.
Michie and Wishlade (2013) point out that, in the German case, the 
Federal Government hold 80% of the shares of the KfW group, while 
the remaining 20%  are held by the German regional states. While 
KfW was originally funded by the Marshall Plan, it currently raises 
about 80 percent of its capital needs in the capital market, with 
a smaller percentage of its funding being provided by the Federal 
Government to reduce interest rates in certain types of financing 
(e.g., for energy efficiency projects).
According to KfW (2013), the decisive factor for the success of 
the group was the fact that, from the outset, the bank distributed 
resources in the form of loans rather than subsidies. As soon as the 
installments came to a completion, the incoming could be used for 
new loans. As a result, KfW still have Marshall Plan fund’s available 
to promote entrepreneurship programs and small and medium-
sized businesses, known as European Recovery Program (ERP), the 
official name of the Marshall Plan.
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Indeed, by not paying dividends to the State, the returns on loans 
and realized profits could be capitalized and used for new loans, 
which strengthened KfW’s corporate capital and expanded its 
position over time. As KfW also receives budgetary resources, it 
provides loans on more favorable terms for priority segments. That 
is, the budgetary resources are used to concessional loans with 
subsidies (difference between market interest and the rates charged 
on granted loans).
The KfW group is one of the largest and most active bond issuers in 
the world. According to a financial report (KfW, 2015), in 2015 more 
than 175 bonds in 14 currencies of the total volume of € 62.6 billion 
were sold to international investors, corresponding to almost 80% of 
their resource requirements in the year. The great differential of the 
bank’s refinancing instruments is security, since they are explicitly 
and directly guaranteed by the Federal Republic of Germany. KfW 
has an AAA credit rating by renowned international agencies such 
as Fitch Ratings and Standard & Poor’s,4 which allows for very 
favorable borrowing and ensures that these conditions are offered 
also in its loans.
The German government occasionally contributes with budget 
resources to KfW’s capital, as happened in 2010, as indicated by 
the IMF (2014), and to the states (Laender) corresponding to 
1.1% of GDP, with the purpose of counterbalancing effects of the 
international financial crisis. Often, the bank adopts a mix of 
interest rates derived from funds of federal budget and market 
4 Recently, KfW has begun to issue the so-called Green Bonds (Made by KfW), designed 
to give investors the possibility to invest in climate protection and encourage support for 
environmental protection activities.
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funding in its financing programs, thus reducing and improving the 
conditions offered for its loans.
The Italian and French institutions, although they do not receive 
fiscal resources, are managers of savings deposits and, therefore, have 
access to stable sources for their development promotion activities. 
In 2015, of Italy’s total CDP funding, € 323 billion, 78% came from 
postal savings, while bank funding accounted for 5.4%, client funds, 
12.3%, and issuance of securities, 4.3%. To diversify sources, channels 
and fundraising instruments, CDP (2015) launched the first retail 
bond of € 1.5 billion, which was fully successful, given the excess 
demand for the maximum amount offered. The funding of the 
Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (CDC) of France, according to 
Madeira and Martini (2015), is diverse, consisting mainly of savings 
deposits (35%), as well as accumulated reserves, securities issuance 
and financial market.
Regarding the Spanish case, the Instituto de Crédito Oficial (ICO) is 
a 100% state-owned bank, linked to the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Competitiveness, through the State Secretariat for Economic 
and Business Support. The institution does not finance its activities 
through the state budget, but raises funds mainly in the capital 
market. When appropriate, the Spanish government may increase 
the capital of ICO in order to maintain its equity participation 
and enlarge its lending capacity. In addition, the debt instruments 
issued by ICO are backed by the direct, explicit, irrevocable and 
unconditional guarantee of the Spanish State, thus carrying low risk.
The Japanese banks, JFC focused on supporting MSMEs, while JBIC 
focused on supporting international business transactions and exports 
through loans, guarantees and equity participation, are exempt from 
tax. They also receive fiscal resources for their operations, usually 
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from budget contributions linked to specific programs. They also 
have an explicit state guarantee.5
The Japanese government holds all outstanding JBIC shares, with the 
bank’s revenue and expenditure budget being submitted to the Finance 
Minister.6 The bank finances its operation through various sources of 
long-term resources, including loans from the Tax and Investment 
Program (Filp), issuance of foreign securities, capital contribution 
from the government and loans from the Special Account of the 
Foreign Exchange Fund. All such forms of financing are included in 
the national budget as an item in the general budget or as an item 
in the budget of the special account.
The issuance of JBIC bonds in the international market is 
guaranteed by the government. The amount of this type of funding 
corresponded to 20.6% of total loans and bonds in 2014. These 
bonds received the same rating as the Japanese government by 
the major rating agencies (A1 of Moody’s and AA- of Standard & 
Poor’s in July 2015). In addition, JBIC issues government unsecured 
securities in the domestic capital market, having received the same 
rating as government-guaranteed securities.
In China, the CBD’s shares are owned by the Ministry of Finance 
(50%), by Central Huijin Investment Ltd., which is a state-owned 
investment company (48%), and by the National Council for Social 
Security Fund (2%). According to Madeira (2015), CDB issues 
most of its securities to local banks and in this case there is a state 
5 The information is contained in the questionnaire attached to the ABDE Report.
6 When budget contributions to JBIC are made, they must be paid during the fiscal 
year in which they were made, except for cases of resource shortage, when the bank can 
refinance them to be paid in one year.
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guarantee. This way of placing the securities guarantees capillarity 
in fundraising. In 2016, CDB received a capital injection of US$ 48 
billion from the Chinese Central Bank to expand its activities.
The South Korean government holds 100% of KDB shares. Além and 
Madeira (2015) point out that its funding is diverse and has been 
changing over time. Initially, two-thirds of its funding consisted of 
central bank transfers, while the rest came from a variety of sources, 
such as public deposits, government loans, and funding from 
multilateral financial institutions and foreign banks. Currently, 60% 
of its funding comes from the issuance of bonds, 19% from loans, and 
17% from term deposits (balance sheet data for 2014). According 
to Madeira and Martini (2015), KDB also manages two public 
funds: the Development and Economic Cooperation Fund and the 
Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund (IKFC).7 The Korean government 
provides capital to KDB when necessary. In addition, it provides 
full guarantee on its debt refinancing. KDB’s fundraising receives 
favorable risk assessments from major international companies, 
AA3 from Moody’s and A+ from Standard & Poor’s.
In Canada, the Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC) is 
solely owned by the Canadian government. This bank is the leader 
in the segment in which it operates in the country, the support for 
MSMEs. It provides loans, venture capital, guarantees and consulting 
services to small enterprises, focusing on technology and exports. 
At government request, it manages the Venture Capital Action Plan 
(VCAP), which is aimed at technology firms. In addition to acting 
7 According to article 32 of the statute, “KDB’s annual net losses are to be offset each 
year by the reserve, and if the reserve is insufficient, the deficit should be offset by the 
government.” Information from the questionnaire attached to the ABDE Report.
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directly, BDC partners with other financial institutions, providing 
capital to financial intermediaries, in order to encourage other 
institutions to provide support for Canadian businesses.
Even when they do not directly receive fiscal or parafiscal 
resources, DFIs often have access to a variety of institutional 
funds. A significant example is the European Union Funds or 
the use of co-financing with the European development banks, 
mainly for MSME projects. Under the Operational Program (OP) 
negotiated and agreed by the European Commission for the 2007-
2013 period, the German regional development banks used these 
funds intensively to co-finance some of their financial instruments. 
Michie and Wishlade (2014) point out that the Spanish ICO 
managed the Jeremie Fund during this period, providing 
guarantees for RTDI (Research, Technological Development and 
Innovation) projects.
Payment of dividends
Among the 12 banks analyzed, three are exempt from paying 
dividends: KfW, in Germany; Vnesheconombank, in Russia; and 
Nacional Financiera, in Mexico. The others may distribute dividends 
to the State.
Each institution adopts a policy for distributing results, although 
it is not possible to acknowledge it only through company reports 
and balance sheets. In the case of ICO, the profits obtained by the 
institution are distributed observing the legislation (ICO Bylaw, 
article 19), which establishes the following order of priority:8
8 Information from the questionnaire attached to the ABDE Report.
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• Establish necessary reserves so that their own resources are 
not less than that corresponding to regulatory rules on capital 
for financial institutions.
• Make allocations to the fund provision referred to in the 
Royal Decree 12/19951, when instructed by the Minister of 
Economy and Competitiveness.
• Establish a voluntary reserve, which must be proposed by the 
ICO president and approved by the Minister of Economy and 
Competitiveness.
• Transfers to the State Treasury.
KDB, in turn, adopts the following rules for profits allocation:
• Forty-percent of profits go to the reserve accounts.
• An additional amount calculated by supervisory rules related 
to banking legislation will be reserved for the provision on 
loan default.
• The remainder will be distributed to the shareholder, 
according to an agreement between the Minister of Strategy 
and Finance and KDB.
In general, development banks are not required to pay mandatory 
minimum dividends. In our sample, only BNDES has the obligation, 
provided for in its bylaws, of a minimum mandatory transfer to the 
Union of 25% of the profits earned.
Since the purpose of the DFIs is not to maximize profits, they 
should not have their performance evaluated solely by their results, 
because the priority of this type of institution is, in general, to 
increase social welfare and economic development. It is normal for 
some segments to show greater default rates than others, especially 
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in moments of crisis. Thus, banks that operate in a diversified 
way can mitigate risks, as they can compose their portfolio with 
different companies and sectors, offsetting possible losses in more 
vulnerable segments.
Most DFIs have positive results even though their goal is not to 
maximize profitability, showing that there is a concern for risk 
management and governance. According to Luna-Martínez and 
Vicente (2012), only 14% of a sample of ninety development banks 
in the world suffered losses in 2009. It is worth noting that when 
profits are reinvested, they help in the institutions’ capitalization 
and in their ability to obtain resources in the market.
Based on balance sheet of the 12 DFIs (Table 4), nine showed profits 
(KfW, National Financial, CDC, CDB, KDB, ICO, JBIC, BDC 
and BNDES), while three experienced losses (Vnesheconombank, 
CDP and JFC). The high loss of the CDP group (€ 859 million in 
2015, corresponding to US$ 934 million) was due to the losses of 
€ 2.9 billion in the subsidiary ENI, an Italian energy company in 
the oil, gas and petrochemicals sector. The market fragility of oil 
industry eroded operating profits and values of the group’s assets. 
As for the Russian bank, the report does not clarify the cause of the 
losses. In turn, the JFC, which focuses on supporting MSMEs, did 
not suffer significant losses (0.8%).
Considering the relation between profit/loss and equity, which 
gives an idea of  the institution’s profitability, we can observe that 
this indicator shows great variation. Of the nine institutions that 
obtained profits, BNDES had the largest ratio (20%), followed by 
CDB (14.4%) and BDC (10.3%). In the case of the others, this ratio 
ranged from 0.6% (ICO) to 8.6% (KfW). This shows that despite they 
do not aim at profitability but at generating favorable effects on 
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the economies of their countries, DFIs can deliver positive results 
if they adequately manage their resources and ensure a balanced 
risk assessment.
It is undeniable that the financial sustainability of these institutions 
is essential to the fulfillment of their respective mandates. In this 
sense, DFIs that are not obliged to distribute dividends, or which do 
so only in part, enjoy additional advantages due to the possibility 
of incorporating capital-based profits, with the consequent increase 
in the institution’s lending capacity.
Table 4 • Result (profit/loss) in relation to equity









KfW (Germany) 2,363 27,420 8.60%
Vnesheconombank (Russia) -4,129 6,261 -65,90%
Nacional Financiera (Mexico) 75 1,133 6.60%
Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations 
(France)
1,415 38,235 3.70%
Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (Italy) -934 36,539 -2.60%
China Development Bank (China) 15,820 109,672 14.40%
Korea Development Bank (South 
Korea)
1,440 28,817 5.00%
Instituto de Crédito Oficial (Spain) 37 5,812 0.60%
Japan Finance Corporation (Japan) -300 37,577 -0.80%
Japan Bank of International 
Cooperation (Japan)
1,052 19,873 5.30%
Business Development Bank of 
Canada (Canada)
354 3,449 10.30%
BNDES (Brazil) 1,571 7,852 20.00%
Total 18,764 322,641 5.80%
Source: ABDE (2016).




Considering the ABDE Report, of the 12 banks studied, four are 
exempt from tax collection (KfW, Vnesheconombank, JFC and 
Business Development Bank of Canada), while the others are 
required to collect Income Tax.
According to the Germany Association of Public Banks (VÖB, 2014), 
the KfW group, as a public development institution, is considered 
a nontaxable public-law institution, exempt from corporate taxes 
and commercial tariff obligations. The law that created KfW, in 
1948, explicitly defined the tax regime of this bank, providing for 
tax exemption.
Nonetheless, the KfW group income statement in 2015 accounts 
for € 130 million relating to income taxes, which corresponds to 
4.9% of profits from operational activities in the year. According to 
the group report, this figure refers to income taxes of nonexempt 
subsidiaries and their affiliates, determined in accordance with the 
tax laws of the country of residence.
Similarly, Vnesheconombank, although statutorily exempt from 
taxes, also recorded a residual amount in its balance sheet, probably 
due to some specific taxable activities.
It is interesting to note that the ICO was exempt from Corporate 
Income Tax, from 1993 to 1996, as established by Royal Decree 
3/1993. Subsequently, in accordance with the provisions of 
Transitional Law 43/1995 on Corporate Income Tax, the institution 
was exempt from this tax in 1997 and 1998, but in 1999 it became 
subject to the General Income Tax.
In the case of JBIC, since it is a public corporation as defined by the 
corporation tax law, it enjoys corporate tax exemption. In addition, 
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it is exempt from other taxes as provided by different laws. The 
rationale for these benefits is that JBIC is totally different from 
private commercial banks in nature, object, and mission.
It should be noted that KDB is treated in the same way as other 
financial institutions. However, according to the bank, it is possible 
that partial exemption from income tax would be granted under a 
special tax treaty on financial institutions that act as a central bank 
or perform governmental functions.
Table 5 shows the amounts paid as income tax from various banks 
and its comparison with profits received. The most profitable 
institutions were KDB (37%) and Instituto de Credito Oficial (36%), 
followed by BNDES (33%) and CDC (26%). In the case of CDC, the 
high loss of the group, due to the negative result of the subsidiary 
company ENI, distorts the relation between the Income Tax and its 
result shown in corporate accounts (146%).
Table 5 • Income Tax in relation to result (profit/loss)











KfW (Germany) 141 2,880 2,363 4.91%
Vnesheconombank (Russia) 43 -4,086 -4,129 -1.05%
Nacional Financiera (Mexico) 23 97 75 23.17%
Caisse des Dépôts et 
Consignations (France)
497 1,922 1,415 25.88%
Cassa Depositi e Prestiti 
(Italy)
560 -382 -934 -146.44%
China Development Bank 
(China)
5,048 20,867 15,820 24.19%
Korea Development Bank 
(South Korea)
840 2,281 1,440 36.84%
Instituto de Crédito Oficial 
(Spain)
















Japan Finance Corporation 
(Japan)
0 -300 -300 0.00%
Japan Bank of International 
Cooperation (Japan)
0 1,052 1,052 0.00%
Business Development Bank 
of Canada (Canada)
0 354 354 0.00%
BNDES 829 2,475 1,571 33.49%
Source: ABDE (2016).
Note: Values converted to dollar based on the exchange rate on the last day of the year.
Regulation and the Basel Accord
In a sample of four development banks (BNDES, China Development 
Bank, Japan Finance Corporation and KfW), Além, Ferraz and 
Madeira (2013) verified that BNDES is the only one regulated by 
the same institution that oversees private banks, the Brazilian 
Central Bank.
KfW and JFC are regulated directly by the responsible ministries, 
while CBD is supervised by the central government. In the case 
of ICO, the State Secretariat of Economy is responsible for 
the strategic management and for the results evaluation and 
activities control.
Typically, the DFIs are regulated by specific legislation and are 
not formally subject to the rules defined by the Basel Accord on 
banking supervision and liquidity and capital standards. This results 
in greater operational flexibility for these institutions, which have 
distinct characteristics and objectives from those of the commercial 
banking sector.
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Nevertheless, all these banks seek to follow some of the rules that 
govern the private sector, including those relating to the Basel 
Accord. KfW voluntarily applies certain rules of the German 
Banking Act, including the capital requirement. The CBD monitors 
its capital requirement levels based on the Commercial Banks Capital 
Adequacy Management Guidelines. Because JBIC is considered to 
be distinct from private banks, it is not subject to the Basel Accord, 
although it does recognize the importance of risk management 
and adopts integrated risk management. ICO complies with the 
provisions of national law governing credit institutions in general, 
based on the Basel Accord. In turn, KDB has informed that it is 
subject to the rules of the Basel III Accord.
Some lessons from 
international experiences
The importance of DFIs for national and local economic 
development is justified both because they overcome structural 
difficulties in long-term financing in certain segments or activities 
and because they counterbalance the natural decline in the private 
credit market in times of crisis. Countries at different stages 
of development have used and continue to use this instrument 
intensively to support their investment policies. Even in developed 
economies with complex and advanced economic structures, the 
performance of DFIs, particularly development banks, remains 
fundamental. This is the case, for example, of Germany, which has 




In the context of the recent global crisis and post-crisis periods, 
new economic, social and environmental challenges were posed; 
both for developed and less developed countries, and only increased 
the importance of credit and development alternatives provided 
by DFIs.
The mandates and goals of the DFIs vary according to the needs and 
specificities of each country, undergoing adjustments throughout 
their development process. There is no single model for the 
structuring and operation of DFIs, which may vary in relation to 
the structure of ownership (totally or partially state-owned), the 
focus of activities (restricted or broad) and the distribution form of 
their financing (direct or indirect).
The relationships between a DFI and the State also differs, such as 
in the funding structure (budget resources, public loans, securities 
issuances), dividend payment (exempted or not), tax payment 
(total, partial or identical to the private sector) and regulation and 
supervision of activities.
For them to be financially sustainable, it is necessary, on the 
one hand, to provide DFIs with stable and sustainable sources 
of resources. On the other, to ensure that there is adequate risk 
management of the loan portfolio and good governance, without 
hindering the fulfillment of their mandates.
In emerging economies with a history of instability, access by DFIs 
to fiscal or parafiscal resources can be considered vital (as in the 
case of Brazil). But in advanced economies or in those with more 
balanced competitive conditions, institutions can be funded only 
with the return of loans, provided that they are granted to finance 
viable projects.
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In order to serve the function of fostering investment and promoting 
economic activity, especially private, the most important aspect of 
DFI financing is that it should count on a stable source of resources, 
and even when those funds are public, they should not depend on 
political decisions that are vulnerable to momentary instabilities 
and subject to short-term imbalances. Originating in the fiscal 
budget or not, whether it is a regular transfer or a one-time 
capitalization contribution, it is also important that the allocation 
by the DFI should be decided by technical criteria and be immune 
to specific interest groups but subject and aligned, however, to the 
socioeconomic development strategy of long-term sustainability.
An emblematic case is KfW, which receives a wide range of direct 
and indirect benefits from the State. If, at the outset, budgetary 
resources made up almost entirely the bank’s funding, with 
subsequent loan returns and the strengthening of the bank and 
the economy, the composition of its funding changed, becoming 
increasingly based on its own resources raised mostly in the capital 
markets. The government’s biggest benefit to KfW has become the 
explicit state guarantee for its obligations, which enables the bank 
to raise funds in the market at extremely favorable terms and rates, 
and grants the transfer of these conditions to its clients.
Also worth mentioning is the case of BNDES, which regularly 
receives fiscal resources from FAT, corresponding to tax collection 
linked to the federal fiscal budget. Since this allocation is 
constitutional stipulated, it is not vulnerable to decisions that 
may change from year to year. In this case, the financial and 
operational autonomy of the main Brazilian DFI is ensured by the 




Also important for the strengthening of the capital base and the 
funding capacity of the KfW group and other development banks 
is the nonpayment of dividends and the exemption or reduction of 
taxes. In the Brazilian case, BNDES and state development banks 
and agencies are obliged to pay dividends to their public controllers, 
reducing the sources of funds for their loans.
In turn, regulatory and supervisory rules are important to ensure 
good governance, adequate risk management and financial 
sustainability of the DFIs. However, international experience 
shows that, in principle, it would not be appropriate to adopt 
exactly the same rules applied to the private financial system, but 
rather to adapt them to the characteristics and mandates of these 
institutions. For example, the minimum capital requirement under 
the Basel Accord for higher risk loans may induce a DFI to lend to 
lower risk companies and projects, reducing their ability to finance 
projects in priority sectors.
Finally, it should be remembered that, in Brazil, the private 
credit market has a chronic problem of restrictions on long-term 
financing, given the restricted capital market, high interest rates, 
preference for the liquidity of private banks and investor risk 
aversion, and an institutional environment of uncertainty and 
insecurity for creditors.
Having an institution of the size and importance of BNDES, which 
has a stable resource base for financing segments and sectors that 
are not attractive to the private market, represents a significant 
advantage, especially in the current economic recession. In a context of 
economic crisis and increasing need for investments in infrastructure 
and strategic segments to boost the economy, it is necessary to think 
of ways to strengthen BNDES, as well as the regional banks and 
development agencies, and diversify their sources of financing.
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In view of the model of a financial system such as in Germany, 
composed of two national development banks (KfW and 
Rentenbank) and a strong network of regional banks, some measures 
should be studied. These included the reduction of the tax burden, 
the concession of explicit government guarantees in the refinancing 
of their obligations, and the review of the rules of regulation and 
supervision of activities in order to adapt them to DFIs’ characteristics 
and purposes, while observing the need to adopt good governance 
and risk management practices. At the same time, the effectiveness 
of the DFIs disbursements in the transformations of the productive 
base should be assessed to ensure that the financing is channeled to 
the strategic and priority development segments.
Some authors observe that international experiences show that 
most DFIs incur higher financial costs than the corresponding 
private banks, while BNDES is one of the few offering lower rates 
and hence inevitably seen as a competitor of private banks. In other 
countries, even at a higher cost, clients can choose to borrow from 
a DFI because they can have access to an associated quality advisory 
service for their projects, and because they prefer to remain as a 
long-term DFI client.
Even with overheads costs higher than most private commercial 
banks, DFIs are often able to raise funds at lower rates than 
their private partners, as the UN report found. As for financial 
institutions focused on the long-term and committed to promoting 
viable economic activities and sustainable development financing, 
frequent access to the credit market creates competition and 
contributes to the strengthening of the financial market, because as 




Comparisons between foreign DFIs also reveal a very important 
effect on taxation, and on profits distribution to the state 
controller. It is well known that tax systems are different, as well 
as their tax burdens, but the taxation of corporate income tends to 
be even more differentiated. In the Brazilian case, where high rates 
are applied on profits, there is still an additional tax on financial 
institutions, underestimating the effective taxation on BNDES. 
As taxes and dividend payments inevitably translate into larger 
spreads, the result is that BNDES’s rates are, for example, higher 
than those of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and 
the World Bank.
A renewed BNDES
Relationship with the state
The 1988’s Federal Constitution altered the relationship of BNDES 
with the state when it established its main source of funds:9 it made 
it an institution independent of the federal budget. Until then, the 
institution had to negotiate its budget every year with the Federal 
Government, but now it became a development bank in the most 
modern sense. The Constitution also provided for its transition 
to a profitable state-owned enterprise and a dividend provider for 
the Federal Government. The Federal Government’s economic 
development priorities now direct the BNDES Operational Policy, 
9 The Federal Constitution of 1988 established that at least 40% of the collection of 
contributions to the Social Integration Program (PIS) and to the Civil Servant Investment 
Program (Pasep) would be allocated to BNDES for the financing of economic development 
programs. In 1990, the National Congress created the Workers’ Assistance Fund (FAT) 
and linked the PIS-Pasep funds to its capitalization.
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which became subject to the regulation of the Brazilian Central Bank, 
to ensure that the best banking practices at the time would be pursued.
Thus, FAT obtained the expected return and gradually directed 
special deposits to BNDES, when the regular transfers were 
insufficient. In addition to these permanent sources of resources, 
there are other important sources, such as those from the return 
of projects and international funding. Almost twenty years have 
passed, a sufficient time to consolidate management practices, 
following these best practices.
In the wake of the 2008-2011 international crisis, however, the 
National Treasury (TN) began to make loans to BNDES (and to 
other state-owned banks) through the issuance and direct delivery of 
securities, making it subordinate and dependent on a cheap resource. 
FAT, which corresponded to more than 50% of the resources until 
2007, was replaced by the TN, reaching almost 58% of the sources of 
funding in 2014 (Chart 1). Resources were also occasionally raised 
from international funding, usually with higher costs. The excessive 
use of these resources has contributed to the deterioration of the fiscal 
situation of the state.10 This process was interrupted in December 
2015, when FAT became again the main source of BNDES’s funds. 
The accumulated amount received from the TN, from 2009 to 2017, 
totaled almost R$ 661 billion.11 But the financial independence from 
the government has been partially restored.
10 See Afonso (2017).
11 Of these, R$  361 billion (March 2017) were invested in equalizable programs 
by TN to BNDES. That is, 54% incur additional costs arising from the difference 
between TN funding and the rates imposed on BNDES by the Federal Government. The 
average rate for the final client is 5.2% p.a. A parafiscal source, without significant costs to 
society, was replaced by funds raised at market prices by TN and disbursed at an average 
rate lower than FAT’s funding.
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Chart 1 • BNDES Liabilities, Financial Statements on December 31

























































Sources of domestic market External borrowings – market
External borrowings – multilateral organizations Net equityOther obligations
Sources: BNDES (2017) and BNDES Audited Financial Statements (2001 and 2016), available at 
www.bndes.gov.br.
Flow of resources between BNDES 
and the Federal Government: 
taxation and dividends
The BNDES’s dividend distribution policy is defined in its bylaws, 
which establishes a minimum payment of 25% of the net profit to 
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the Federal Government, respecting the prudential and minimum 
corporate capital limits. However, under Law 13,303 of June 30, 
2016, which regulates state-owned enterprises, new rules were 
established on the dividend policy, with a destination of at least 
40% of the profit for capitalization. As a result, the strengthening 
of BNDES’s capital structure is expected. We can observe in Table 
6 that BNDES has been an important source of taxes and dividends 
for the Federal Government, especially since 2008.
Table 6 • BNDES payments of taxes and dividends to the Treasury -  
2001 to 2016 (R$ million, in current values)
Year Dividends paid
in the year (A)
Taxes paid
in the year (B)
Total 
(A+B)
2001 550 964 1,514
2002 497 1,565 2,062
2003 607 781 1,388
2004 265 1,581 1,846
2005 1,429 1,992 3,421
2006 3,566 1,990 5,556
2007 405 2,284 2,689
2008 6,017 3,486 9,503
2009 10,950 2,121 13,071
2010 8,725 5,954 14,679
2011 6,905 2,687 9,592
2012 12,938 5,135 18,073
2013 6,999 5,643 12,642
2014 9,080 5,991 15,071
2015 4,972 5,215 10,187
2016 217 8,188 8,405
Total 74,121 55,577 129,698
Source: BNDES (2017).
Another relevant aspect of the Law of State-owned Enterprises 
was to establish rules for the appointment of executive directors 
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and members of the Advisory Board, privileging the technical and 
banking management experience in the selection of its members. 
The law also amends the rules of governance, of controllership, the 
bylaws and the internal regulations. The expected result is increased 
transparency, modernization of processes and controls, and new 
commitments to the effectiveness of operational policies.
Final considerations
This article aimed to review concepts and explore the experience of 
DFIs around the world, with an emphasis on governance and the 
relationship with the state. The objective is to reflect on certain 
points in order to strengthen and stimulate the renewal of the 
main Brazilian development institution towards what is observed 
internationally as best practices.
International experience shows that, in order to be financially 
sustainable, it is required, on the one hand, to provide DFIs with 
stable and sustainable sources of resources and, on the other, to 
ensure that there is adequate risk management of the loan portfolio 
and good governance, without hindering the fulfillment of their 
mandates. In emerging economies with a history of instability, the 
access of DFIs to fiscal or parafiscal resources can be considered 
vital, as is the case in Brazil. But in advanced or more balanced 
economies, institutions may be funded only with the return of 
loans, provided they are granted for economically viable projects.
In order to foster investments, promote private economic activity 
and stimulate the business environment, the most important factor 
in the financing of DFIs is to ensure they have a stable source of 
resources and, even if those resources are public, that they are not 
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dependent on short-term policy decisions and thus vulnerable 
to specific interest groups as opposed to the social interest. 
Originating in the fiscal budget or not, being a regular transfer or 
a one-time capitalization contribution, it is also important that 
the allocation by the DFI be decided by technical criteria, with the 
greatest transparency possible, enabling it to meet the demands 
of the society to which it is the main institution for sustainable 
economic development.
In the case of BNDES, which regularly receives fiscal resources 
from FAT and mandatory transfers from the federal fiscal budget, 
the allocation is stipulated by constitutional determination. It is 
therefore not vulnerable to policy decisions that may change from 
year to year. In this case, the financial and operational autonomy 
of the main Brazilian DFI is ensured by the country’s Federal 
Constitution, even though its main source of funds is fiscal and 
budgetary resources.
International experience shows that most DFIs incur higher 
financial costs than the corresponding private banks, with BNDES 
being one of the few offering lower rates. Clients abroad can choose 
to finance themselves with a DFI because they can have a quality 
project consulting service and at the same time remain as clients, 
even if the cost is higher.
The comparisons show a very different effect on taxation and 
distribution of profits to the state controller. Tax systems are different, 
as well as tax burdens and corporate taxation. In the Brazilian case, 
where high rates are levied on profits, especially on the banking 




The relationships between the DFIs and their state controller should 
be regarded in the larger context of the economy. In the post-crisis 
period, new economic, social and environmental challenges were 
posed, both for developed and less developed countries, and only 
increased the importance of credit and development alternatives 
provided by the DFIs. That happened especially because only DFIs 
have unequivocal commitments to the long-term well-being of the 
population.
Following the example of the successful German model, some measures 
could serve as a guide for other DFIs, especially the Brazilian one. They 
consist of: the reduction of the tax burden, granting of guarantees by 
the controlling government in the refinancing of its obligations, and 
the overhaul of the rules of regulation and supervision to adapt them 
to DFIs’ characteristics and purposes, without, however, jeopardizing 
good governance practices and risk management. In order to 
strengthen the capital base and the financing capacity, it would also 
be desirable not to pay dividends or to reinvest them.
It has become a rule of good banking practice to evaluate the 
effectiveness of DFIs’ investments in transforming the productive 
base to ensure that financing is properly directed to strategic and 
priority development segments, accompanied by transparency and 
corporate responsibility.
In Brazil, having an institution like BNDES represents a significant 
advantage, especially in the current economic recession. In 
addition, with the need for increasing investments in infrastructure 
and strategic segments, it is necessary to expand its sources of 
funding and its network of partnerships and co-financing with 
the market.
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BNDES, which has been renewed in governance, transparency 
and risk management, is preparing itself for the new demands. 
The change in dividend distribution rules also helps to strengthen 
the capital structure. There is still a long way to go in relation 
to socioenvironmental priorities and the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of its activities, but the institution clearly responds 
with responsibility to the demands of the Brazilian society and is 
instrumental in meeting the challenges that are to come.
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